The Internet is framed as a market design for information with major actors
supplying and demanding information, and supply and demand tending toward
equilibrium, as a paradigm of a distributed computational system. Concepts of
information flows and delivery provisions would reflect game-theoretic models of trade
and exchange economies where the mechanism (design) of information flows would
adopt the behavior and outcome of mathematical queueing systems. Of particular
interest are large scale systems of the Internet type that act and perform as
decentralized distributed systems of multi-level control. A prototype economic
optimization model is put forward for a network economy with variation in traffic
classes, utility parameters, queueing types and equilibrium approaches.
Keywords: Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), Auctions, B-ISDN, Broadband,
Buffer Space, Complexity, FIFO, Game-theoretic System, Interdomain
Routing, Mechanism Design, Multi-Agent System (MAS), Network Economy,
Networking, Optimum Allocations, Pareto Efficient Allocations, Quality of
Service, Queueing Model, Traffic Classes, TELNET, Utility Parameters.
